User:Theleekycauldron/Drafts/Fedorenko v. United States

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Fedorenko v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 15, 1980
Decided January 21, 1981
Full case nameFeodor Fedorenko v. United States
Citations449 U.S. 490 (more)
101 S. Ct. 737; 66 L. Ed. 2d 686
Case history
PriorCertiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Holding
As a person who had assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians, Fedorenko's visa was illegally procured and therefore his citizenship must be revoked under § 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityMarshall, joined by Brennan, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist
ConcurrenceBurger
ConcurrenceBlackmun
DissentWhite
DissentStevens

Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States revolving around the citizenship status of Feodor Fedorenko.

Okay, basically three issues at play:

  1. Actually committing the thing / duress / witnesses
  2. Materiality
  3. Equitable discretion

Background

Case

The aftermath of World War II saw many attempts on the part of the United States and other Allied countries to address a large number of refugees and other displaced persons stemming from the war. In 1948, the United States government passed the Displaced Persons Act (DPA), which allowed the government to ignore its regular quotas when admitting refugees from the war. However, the act contained language from the constitution of the International Refugee Organization that disqualified those who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations" or "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations".[1] It also provided that "Any person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purposes of gaining admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the United States".[2]

One person who came to the United States through the DPA was Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukrainian-born citizen of the Soviet Union. In June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the country as a part of World War II, leading Fedorenko to be drafted into the Red Army. Within a month of being mobilized, he was captured by the Germans. After moving through several prisoner of war camps,[3] Fedorenko was trained in early 1942 to be a guard, and was transferred to work at the Treblinka extermination camp in September 1942.[4] The question of whether or not Fedorenko committed atrocities at Treblinka, and whether or not he did so voluntarily, was never resolved conclusively.[citation needed]

  • needs a ton of filling in
  • More on Treblinka
  • Immigrated to the United States

Denaturalization

In Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government is given the power "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization".[5] As a part of this power, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1906, which provided that a person could be denaturalized in cases of fraud or where the citizenship was "illegally procured".[6] The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that act as a part of its ruling in Johannssen v. United States (1912). In 1952, Congress overwrote that statute with one providing for reversing citizenship obtained "by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation", adding the illegal procurement language back in 1961.[7]

Materiality proved to be a controversial issue among courts, which could not agree as to what constituted a material fact. While the Supreme Court ruled in Johannssen that a fact that would have been disqualifying if disclosed should be considered material, less obvious cases provoked disagreement. Some courts thought that merely stymying an investigation that could have turned up more relevant evidence would be enough to revoke citizenship. Courts struggled with similar problems in deportation cases, developing other standards in that arena. Often, courts would lump various denaturalization criteria together or reference them vaguely.[8]

The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard of materiality in Chaunt v. United States (1960), providing for a two-pronged test where satisfying either would demonstrate materiality. The first prong affirmed the widely agreed-upon standard, while the second designated facts material where the "disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship". This second prong seemingly struck a balance between prior approaches by lower courts; an investigation was necessary to satisfy it, but not sufficient.[9]

Chaunt failed to reduce the confusion and disarray of lower court decisions on the subject, even leading to a circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v. Rossi (1962) and La Madrid-Peraza v. INS (1974), the Ninth Circuit held that the second prong of Chaunt still required the government to show that the facts discovered on a potential investigation would have caused the denial of citizenship. Rossi was also one case that extended the definition of materiality to visa applications, not just citizenship cases, as courts did consistently at the time. The Second Circuit ruled differently in United States v. Oddo (1963), arguing that the second prong only required the government to show that a potential investigation could conceivably have turned up more relevant information.[10]

Equity

Rather than being suits in common law, civil denaturalization cases are decided in equity.[a] This holding dates back to the District Court for the Southern District of New York's ruling in Mansour v. United States (1908), denying the defendant's request for a jury. The court ruled that denaturalization cases are analogous to suits to cancel a government-given grant or patent, which are treated as suits in equity, and that denaturalization cases should be decided similarly.[11] The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning in Luria v. United States (1913), although it did not cite Mansour. At the time Fedorenko was decided, Luria was not seriously challenged as settled precedent.[12] Despite the proceedings being designated as equitable, the Supreme Court has made past rulings that narrow the set of rights normally available to defendants in equitable proceedings. In some of its early decisions, the Supreme Court ordered denaturalization for minor errors such as not making sure that a certificate of lawful arrival was attached to the application for citizenship or not holding the final hearing in open court, holding that it was the responsibility of the applicant to meet all requirements for citizenship and that the law leaves no room for equitable discretion in that matter.[13]

However, the Court has also ruled that naturalized citizens enjoy all of the same rights and privileges as citizens by birth.[14] The courts' pattern of ordering denaturalization liberally changed somewhat in Schneiderman v. United States (1943), in which the Court ruled that it was the government's responsibility to provide "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence in favor of denaturalization, a high bar that approached the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law.[13][15]

Lower courts

District court

Trial

The United States brought civil denaturalization proceedings against Fedorenko in 197_.

The trial was a civil proceeding,

The government was represented by four lawyers, led by the chief assistant U.S. district attorney, John Sale. Fedorenko was represented by Gregg Pomeroy, a lawyer who had served in the local public defender's office but was in private practice by then.[16]

Admitted into evidence was Fedorenko's original 1949 visa application, which contained a photo of him from the time. This made the witnesses' task of identifying the defendant easier, but the trial .

The government called six survivors of Treblinka to the witness stand, all of Israeli citizenship.[17] Their names were Eugun Turkowski, Shalom Kohn, Josef Czarny, Gustaw Boraks, Sonia Lewkowicz, and Pincas Epstein. All six, with the exception of Czarny, said that they had seen Fedorenko beat, whip, or shoot Jews during their time in Treblinka and recounted those stories; Kohn claimed that Fedorenko beat him personally. Czarny presented more circumstantial evidence, but admitted on cross-examination that he had not specifically seen Fedorenko commit the acts he was detailing. Identification of Fedorenko was somewhat trickier: when asked to point to a man in the room, Turkowski incorrectly identified an elderly man in the spectators' section. The courtroom identification was not strictly necessary; Fedorenko's initial application had been admitted into evidence, and the witness correctly identified Fedorenko in the photograph. However, it did damage the government's case. Kohn correctly identified Fedorenko in the room; Czarny, Boraks, and Epstein had correctly identified an earlier picture of Fedorenko from a photo spread shown to him in Israel. On cross-examination of Turkowski and Kohn, Gregg Pomeroy emphasized the involuntary nature of the work they had done at Treblinka, looking to bolster their own argument that Fedorenko had committed those actions under duress.[18]

  • fact check witness identification in np.com

The first witness was 64-year-old Eugun Turkowski, who survived on account of being a mechanic the Germans could put to use. He testified through a Hebrew language–interpreter that he knew Fedorenko because he would come into the repair shop where Turkowski worked, and that he had seen Fedorenko beat and shoot Jews and sometimes order around other guards. [19]

Ruling

The district court ruled for Fedorenko, rejecting the testimony of the Treblinka survivors and Jenkins. Roettger found the photographic spread to constitutionally invalid for identification, as the photograph containing Fedorenko was clearer and bigger than its neighbors, and the spread contained as few as three photos for some of the witnesses. The in-court identification was also ruled invalid, as the court speculated that the two witnesses who correctly pointed out Fedorenko may have been coached following Turkowski's gaffe. The court, therefore, found that the witnesses' testimony was mostly not credible, and the government had not satisfactorily proved that Fedorenko had willingly committed any atrocities that would disqualify him.[20]

On Jenkins' testimony and the question of materiality, the court rejected the government's argument for a broad interpretation of Chaunt, instead ruling that its second prong only applied where the investigation in question would have revealed disqualifying facts. Roediger reasoned, relying on the Ninth Circuit, that an investigation at the time would have found that Fedorenko was forced to work as a guard at Treblinka and would have admitted him.[21][22] Fedorenko might have been disqualified on the plain language of the DPA – the clause on persecuting civilians does not explicitly contain an exemption for duress, while the subsequent clause does – but the court ruled that if the persecution clause did not have a duress exemption, it would be forced to deny entry to kapos, an unjust result that necessitated the existence of a voluntariness standard.[23] Finally, the court asserted that it had discretion as a court in equity to rule for Fedorenko, given his nearly three decades living in the United States with a near-spotless record in that time. Citing the evidence presented in support of Fedorenko's character, including being viewed positively by people around him, Roettger found that his power to make sure the case had a fair outcome – regardless of the law – extended to ruling to preserve his citizenship.[24]

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

The government appealed the district court's ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, disputing the decision with respect to materiality, equitable discretion, and reliability of witness testimony. On June 28, 1979, writing for a three-judge panel, John Minor Wisdom reversed the district court's ruling on the first two grounds. The third was ignored, as the first two were deemed sufficient to reverse. With regards to materiality, the Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit's path in the split on Chaunt, ruling that since a disclosure might have caused the government to find facts worth denying citizenship, the misrepresentation was material. The court reasoned that following the Ninth Circuit would require the government to investigate and conclusively discover disqualifying facts, and then prove them against a high standard of evidence. Such a barrier would be too difficult for the government to meet, the court reasoned, and would instead incentivize applicants to misrepresent their cases.[22]

The appeals court also ruled that the district court erred in using equitable discretion to justify ruling for Fedorenko, holding that it had no discretion to apply to the instant case:

There is a crucial distinction between a district court's authority to grant citizenship and its authority to revoke citizenship. In the former situation, the court must consider facts and circumstances relevant to determining whether an individual meets such requirements for naturalization as good moral character and an understanding of the English language, basic American history, and civics. The district courts must be accorded some discretion to make these determinations. Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship, however, the district court as no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship. The denaturalization statute does not accord the district courts any authority to excuse the fraudulent procurement of citizenship.[25]

Supreme Court

  • Affirms appellate i.j.n.b.s.o.
  • Completely sidesteps Chaunt for no god damn reason
  • Concurs on equitable discretion

Concurrences

Dissents

Reaction, analysis, and impact

  • Wunsch criticizes equitable discretion

Notes

  1. ^ The U.S. government can also seek denaturalization through an indictment in criminal court, under 18 U.S.C § 1425. See Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. ___.

References

Citations

  1. ^ Bylciw 1982, p. 951. Quoting Displaced Persons Act.
  2. ^ Binder 1982, p. 133. Quoting Displaced Persons Act.
  3. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, p. 251.
  4. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, p. 252.
  5. ^ Binder 1982, p. 134. Quoting U.S. Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 4.
  6. ^ Binder 1982, p. 134, explicitly refers to the act as the "Immigration and Nationality Act of 1906", but no act exists by that title and the language used by Binder matches the text of the Naturalization Act of 1906. Quoting Naturalization Act of 1906.
  7. ^ Binder 1982, pp. 134–135. Quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
  8. ^ Binder 1982, pp. 135–136.
  9. ^ Binder 1982, p. 136–137. Quoting Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. at 355.
  10. ^ Binder 1982, p. 137; Parker 1982, pp. 415, 418.
  11. ^ Wunsch 1981–1982, pp. 363–364.
  12. ^ Wunsch 1981–1982, pp. 364–365.
  13. ^ a b Binder 1982, p. 135.
  14. ^ Wunsch 1981–1982, p. 363.
  15. ^ Wunsch 1981–1982, p. 366.
  16. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, p. 253.
  17. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, p. 254.
  18. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014. Turkowski on pp. 254–256; Kohn on pp. 256–257; Czarny on pp. 257–258; Boraks on pp. 258–259; Lewkowicz on p. 261; Epstein on pp. 261–262.
  19. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, pp. 254–255.
  20. ^ Parker 1982, pp. 413–414; Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, p. 266.
  21. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, pp. 267–268; Parker 1982, p. 416.
  22. ^ a b Parker 1982, pp. 417–419.
  23. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, pp. 267–268.
  24. ^ Bazyler & Tuerkheimer 2014, pp. 268–269.
  25. ^ Evans 1980, pp. 188–189. Quoting United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 953–954.

Works cited

Academic sources

  • Evans, Alona E. (1980). "Citizenship—denaturalization—failure to disclose service as concentration camp guard during Second World War". American Journal of International Law. 74 (1): 186–189. doi:10.2307/2200914.
  • Wunsch, Gerald A. (1981–1982). "Should equitable discretion apply in denaturalization proceedings: Fedorenko v. United States". Immigration and Nationality Law Review. 5: 359–378.
  • Binder, Patricia A. (1982). "Fedorenko v. United States: A new test for misrepresentation in visa applications". North Carolina Journal of International Law. 7: 129–141. Retrieved May 14, 2024.
  • Bylciw, Diane Goffer (1982). "Immigration law--revocation of citizenship--Fedorenko v. United States". New York Law School Law Review. 27 (3): 951–970.
  • Dienstag, Abbe L. (1982). "Fedorenko v. United States: War crimes, the defense of duress, and American nationality law". Columbia Law Review. 82 (1): 120–183. doi:10.2307/1122241. JSTOR 1122241.
  • Parker, Jann M. (1982). "Establishing workable standards in denaturalization proceedings: Fedorenko v. United States". Connecticut Law Review. 14 (2): 409–434.
  • Bazyler, Frank M.; Tuerkheimer (2014). "The trial of Feodor Fedorenko: Treblinka relived in a Florida courtroom". Forgotten Trials of the Holocaust. New York University Press. pp. 247–273. ISBN 9781479899241. JSTOR j.ctt9qfr64.13.

Legal citations

Other sources

See also

External links

Category:United States immigration and naturalization case law Category:United States Supreme Court cases Category:United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court Category:1981 in United States case law Category:Nazism Category:Denaturalization case law

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